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 As Baer and Redcay (2001) observe, “in recent years, merger enforcement 
has largely been accomplished by negotiation rather than litigation,” and   
over two-thirds of FTC and DOJ merger challenges in fiscal 1998 and 1999 
were resolved by “negotiated restructuring.”  Yet, while there is a lot of 
economics literature on the effects of mergers, I am not aware of much on 
merger fixes and divestitures.  Similarly, while there is a lot of economics 
literature on optimal government merger policy if “the government always 
wins,” I do not know of much economic analysis of policy for the 
government as antitrust negotiator and litigator.  This chapter is a very 
preliminary exploration, making three somewhat separate points. 
First, agencies should beware of over-trusting the buyer of the divested 
assets.
 1  A strong argument can be made that the buyer is a teammate not of 
the agency but of the merging parties. 
Second, many commentators disapprove of “remedies” that do not directly 
fix competitive problems arising from the merger.  One economic rationale 
for such disapproval concerns effects on incentives for firms to seek and 
pursue merger opportunities.  Perhaps surprisingly, this could suggest a 
somewhat unsympathetic attitude toward efficiencies that coexist with 
competitive harm, even if the real policy goal is total surplus. 
Third, the government does not always win.  An oversimplified bargaining 
model of remedy negotiation between the agency and the merging parties 
suggests that, even if its true goal is total surplus, an agency might 
encourage staff to discount (or even be hostile to) efficiencies, especially 
when the parties have significant bargaining power.  This is because 
efficiencies will already be taken into account through the parties’ influence 
on the actual (bargaining) outcome.  With symmetric bargaining power, one 
model suggests that if the true goal is total surplus then the government 
should pursue consumer (or non-parties’) welfare and ignore effects on 
merging parties’ profits such as efficiencies that will not be passed through. 
I stress that this chapter is very much a suggestive exploration.  None of 
what follows is fully worked out or ready for policy application, but it does 
show a need for further research. 
                                                           
1 I refer to the acquirer of divested assets as the buyer; as between the merging parties I do not distinguish 
between acquiring and acquired firms. 1. Is the Buyer an Ally of Competition? 
The FTC Staff Report on divestitures suggests that when divestitures fail, 
the buyer’s ignorance or lack of bargaining power (reluctance to demand 
much from the merging parties) may be to blame.  This may reflect a general 
view that the buyer is broadly on the right side. 
But since the buyer is buying assets from the merging parties, it has a 
close and flexible financial nexus with them.  Standard cooperative 
bargaining theory, or the Coase Theorem, thus suggests that they will reach 
an agreement that maximizes (as best they contractually can) the sum of 
their payoffs.  If the value of the merging parties’ assets is maximized by 
failing to use them to the hilt – the core concept of a conventionally 
anticompetitive horizontal merger – then the total value to the merging 
parties plus the buyer may well also be maximized if they can replicate this 
outcome.   
In the simplest case, an anticompetitive horizontal merger gives the 
merged firm an incentive to reduce output.  If they would do this by shutting 
down some of their capacity post-merger, then much the same result can be 
obtained by selling this capacity to a buyer in a crippled form.  Thus suppose 
that the merging parties have capacities k1 and k2, and that k1 + k2 is large 
enough that it pays (privately but not socially) to leave some unused.  If they 
must divest k* to a third firm with existing capacity k3, but can cripple it so 
that it amounts only to tk* (with t < 1), then, by the same token, one would 
expect it will be profitable to do so.  That is, if, post-transaction, the merged 
firms 1 and 2 will control capacity k1 + k2 – k* and firm 3 will control k3 + 
tk*, then total profits to firms 1 to 3 jointly will be increased by setting t 
below 1.  This does not involve fooling or browbeating firm 3 about the 
level of t, although of course that could be another reason to reduce t. 
Worse, if k3 > 0 then the three-way joint incentives could be to cripple 
some capacity (t < 1) even if the two-way incentives for firms 1 and 2 jointly 
would not be anticompetitive.  Divestiture can make things worse, even 
assuming k3 < k1 + k2.  In effect, the divestiture can bring firm 3 into the 
nexus within which competitive cross-effects might be anticompetitively 
internalized.  There is a tradeoff, not always recognized explicitly.   
More specifically, without divestiture, the unilateral-effect question is 
whether k1 + k2 is a large enough part of industry capacity to permit the exercise of market power (with no behavioral controls on the merged firm’s 
ability to do so).   With the divestiture, the question is in part whether k1 + k2 
+ k3 is large enough to permit the exercise of market power through choices 
(such as defining divested assets) that the firms can achieve given limits on 
the divestiture contract.  Depending on the size of k3 and on the rigors of 
those contract limits, one would expect the tradeoff could go either way.  
Importantly, this is quite different from the question of whether k3 + k* (or k3 
+ tk*) gives firm 3 unilateral market power. 
In short, the buyer has an incentive to help maximize the merger’s 
anticompetitive effects, because and as long as the price it pays reflects the 
effects on the merging parties of the divestiture’s competitive significance.  
It has no incentive to insist on, or help the agency insist on, a divestiture 
package that truly preserves competition.  Nor has it an incentive to demand 
key complements that will make the transferred assets competitively potent.  
Doing such competition-friendly things would shrink the financial pie to be 
divided between the buyer and the merging parties; hence standard 
cooperative bargaining theory (or a private version of the Coase theorem) 
suggests we should not expect it. 
The expression of joint market power on the part of firms 1 to 3 may not 
be limited to the destruction or crippling of capacity.  If the three firms 
jointly have joint market power (as presumably they do when there is a 
problem to be remedied, since that suggests that firms 1 and 2 have joint 
market power), they may try to limit competition between the merged firm 
and firm 3 in other ways.  For instance, they might include in the divestiture 
agreement various continuing entanglements such as some supply 
arrangements, seller financing, etc.    
To a degree, these problems are well recognized.  For instance, the 
agencies often prohibit divestiture deals that enshrine certain kinds of 
continuing entanglements, and of course divestitures that nakedly fix output 
prices would be unacceptable (and, I trust, illegal).  Similarly, it is widely 
taken as a bad sign if the buyer is paying a zero (or negative) price, signaling 
that the divested capacity will have little value in the buyer’s hands and is 
thus essentially being destroyed.  But this screen has several holes.  First, 
divestiture sales may include a variety of assets, so the price of the core 
capacity may be hard to pin down.  Second, a buyer with a large market 
share might willingly buy crippled capacity, in order to make an 
anticompetitive deal go through.  And third, the merger could create anticompetitive gains even if the buyer gets the inframarginal or “good” 
capacity and the merging parties cripple some of what they keep; in that 
case, the buyer would presumably be willing to pay a high price for the 
capacity it gets.  Thus, much may be riding on the agencies’ behavioral rules 
about maintaining the assets that are to be divested: such rules may be hard 
to enforce, especially when staff lack specialized knowledge.
2  And, in 
general, I fear that the problem is sometimes underestimated. 
In summary, the buyer and the parties have a common interest in limiting 
their competition if they have joint market power, which is presumably the 
starting point of the remedy negotiation process.  This incentive can tempt 
them to cripple capacity and to structure deals so as to make the buyer 
dependent on the goodwill of the merged firm, but the implications go 
further.  For instance, it will also affect the buyer’s advice to staff about 
likely competitive effects of different divestiture packages. 
This perspective, according to which the buyer is on the merging parties’ 
team, differs in tone from (for instance) the FTC staff’s 1999 Divestiture 
Study, which largely attributed failures to buyers’ ignorance or lack of 
bargaining power, rather than to their incentives, even while expressing 
suspicion of the merging parties’ incentives.
3   
Not only does my perspective differ from the Study’s, but it may seem 
rather pessimistic.  In practice things often do seem better than this 
discussion might suggest, and it is interesting (if that impression is correct) 
to ask why.  One point is that the incentives change dramatically if the 
divestiture price is fixed and no longer varies with what the buyer gets.  
Then it has an incentive to get as profitable a business as possible, and no 
longer internalizes the effect on the merging parties.  But of course this is 
not an ideal solution, because the buyer now has an incentive to ask for 
everything! 
 Research and/or policy questions thus include: (a) when is the divestiture 
price (presumably including in-kind side payments, complicating matters) 
sufficiently fixed so that the buyer wants more, rather than wanting to 
maximize the joint profit; (b) is it empirically true that the buyer’s attitude 
changes when negotiations have reached a stage such that it no longer has an 
                                                           
2 Baer and Redcay (2001) mention Schnuck’s as an egregious failure in this respect. 
3 Baer and Redcay quote the Study to the effect that the merging parties “tended to look for marginally 
acceptable buyers and engage in strategic conduct intended to impede the success of the buyer.” interest in any anticompetitive effects; (c) would it be possible to structure 
divestiture negotiations so as to accelerate such a shift?  And (d) what does 
all this say about optimal agency rules and practices about the negotiation of 
divestitures? 
2. Scalps, Compensation, and Incentives 
Agencies are sometimes accused of “taking scalps,” demanding 
“remedies” unrelated to competitive problems caused by the merger.  This is 
generally viewed as bad.  Why? 
I think there are two separate issues here.   
  An agency might seek to maximize competition, and/or demand (on 
behalf of consumers) a more competitive outcome after the merger-
plus-remedy than prevailed before.  I will call this over-fixing.  
  An agency might seek remedies not “closely related” to the 
competitive harms caused by the merger.  I will call this broad 
scope. 
Such behavior is often seen as inappropriate or unfair, terms that may not 
seem closely related to economic efficiency.  Yet modern economics 
sometimes analyzes such concerns in terms of ex ante incentives.  Thus 
consider incentives for parties to search for and pursue mergers.   
Over-Fixing 
Consider first a merger between two firms that jointly lack market power.  
If profit-seeking, the merger presumably is motivated by a prospective 
efficiency gain.  An agency might be able to “hold up” the merger by 
demanding concessions, competition-related or not.  Some, though not all, 
such demands would make the market work even more competitively and 
efficiently than it would with just the merger, although (by revealed 
preference) the parties would not gain.  Is it bad for a competition authority 
to seek opportunities to improve market performance? 
One obvious answer is that insistence on over-fixing might make the 
parties abandon the efficient merger.  By analogy with double 
marginalization concerns generally, this might be all the more a concern 
where multiple agencies can demand concessions from a given merger (whether through overlapping jurisdiction, as with communications mergers 
in the United States, or because of the need for clearance in multiple 
geographic jurisdictions). 
A more subtle economic answer might be that, even if ex post the merger 
will go ahead, over-fixing confiscates part of the rents from finding the 
efficient merger and thus discourages firms from seeking out and pursuing 
efficiency-oriented mergers.  This concern echoes modern economics’ 
general concern with ex post holdup power even where it is (in a short-run 
sense) efficiently exercised. 
If we want firms to have incentives to seek out all and only efficient 
mergers, it seems the ideal (“first-best”) remedies policy would seek to make 
non-parties in aggregate (consumers plus other firms) exactly whole.  That 
makes the parties residual claimants on the merger’s efficiency effects, and 
plausibly gives them (jointly) efficient search incentives.
4  It would focus 
merger policy plainly on the external effects on non-parties such as 
consumers, consistently with much economic policy generally. 
Such a policy might justify criticism of agency efforts to over-fix even 
through solely competition-oriented demands.  But it would also have other 
implications. 
For instance, it could require disgorgement in the case of efficient 
mergers that otherwise benefit consumers!  More fundamentally, it seems 
there may be an internal consistency issue, at least if there are only a limited 
discrete number of possible remedies.  The logic suggests that a merger that 
increases total surplus but harms consumers should not be approved, even if 
the policy goal is overall efficiency, since approval of such mergers would 
yield excessive (“rent-seeking”) incentives to seek them out.  But then if not 
all efficiency-enhancing mergers go through, it is no longer so clear that, for 
optimal search incentives, policy should seek to make the parties residual 
claimants when a merger does go through. 
This suggests that incentives to pursue mergers should be analyzed in a 
“second-best” way; first-best arguments (such as the argument above against 
overcompensating consumers) are not necessarily compelling.  A good 
                                                           
4 This also depends on the search and negotiation aspects of the merger game among firms.  I do not pursue 
this here. research topic would be the second-best remedies policy taking into account 
incentives to seek and pursue mergers. 
Broad Scope 
Suppose a merger will generate efficiencies but will also be 
anticompetitive.  From the an economic—as opposed to legal—perspective, 
it is not immediately clear why a remedy must take the form of restoring 
competition.  Why not ask more broadly how the winners (e.g. the parties) 
may most cheaply compensate the losers (e.g. consumers)?  For instance, 
merging firms might simply share, through side payments, part of the cost 
savings from the merger.  Or there might be pro-competition changes in 
some other market or along a different dimension (as with star pagination, 
perhaps).  As long as the merger’s efficiencies outweigh its inefficiencies, a 
Pareto improvement could be found in principle, and might be worth seeking 
in practice. 
In a broad sense this would be consistent with the fundamental 
economics of the price system itself.  That system can be viewed as a 
streamlined means of diagnosing an efficiency-improving choice (a 
“potential Pareto improvement”) by forcing its beneficiaries to turn it into an 
actual Pareto improvement.
5  A similar program here would help test for 
whether the merger actually increases total surplus.  That is, if parties 
capture only the efficiency gains and not the efficiency gains plus transfers, 
their incentive to search for and design deals would be closer to efficient.
6  
Moreover, often a more closely targeted remedy inevitably threatens the 
potential efficiencies from a merger; why not countenance lower-cost ways 
to compensate consumers?   
I suspect that many antitrust commentators would dislike this idea, and I 
may even agree; can we say why?  I do not know the answer, but can see 
some problems.  First, there may be a tendency to compensate only those 
losers who might otherwise block the deal: for instance, those likely to 
approach antitrust agencies, or to testify against the merger.  Future 
consumers, in particular, might be left in the cold.  Second, “distant” 
                                                           
5 That is, rather than investigate whether A or B more highly values A’s car, and handing it over to B if B 
values it more highly (and thus could compensate A), the system requires that B actually compensate A.  
Among other properties, this can (especially in a smoothly functioning market) be a good way of finding 
out whether indeed B values the car more than does A. 
6 In particular it is not obviously a good answer that anticompetitive mergers reduce economic efficiency 
and that side payments do not fix that problem: if side payments can be well calibrated, there is a market 
test of the merger’s efficiency contribution. remedies may more likely be inadequate or excessive, because they might be 
substantively harder to calibrate and perhaps also for political-economy 
reasons.  But there is obviously scope for much research on this. 
3. Bargaining and Attitude to Efficiencies 
 
Merger policy is typically analyzed as if “the government always wins.”  
That is, economists have focused on identifying those mergers that should 
go through and those that should not.  That research program would tell the 
agency what to do if it simply got to decide. 
 
But it doesn’t.  Litigation is costly and risky for the government as well 
as for the merging parties.  Therefore there may well be joint gains available 
relative to the default of litigation.  What should an agency’s negotiating 
strategy be?  
 
In this section I sketch an oversimplified model of bargaining between 
the parties and an agency leading to a negotiated settlement.  I then ask in 
the model how agency staff should be instructed to behave, in order to get 
settlements that maximize a higher-level payoff function.
7  I find that staff 
should be asked to be less sympathetic to efficiencies, and more narrowly 
pro-consumer, than the “true” payoff function, and that this “bias” should be 
stronger the more bargaining power the parties have (the weaker the 
agency).  In a simple symmetric model, if the true goal is overall efficiency 
then staff should be instructed to disregard effects on the parties’ profits, 
including efficiencies that are not passed through to consumers. 
 
In the bargaining, the parties already represent their own efficiency 
interests, whereas narrowly consumer interests are represented only by 
agency staff.  If the staff also took into account the parties’ efficiency 
interests, those interests would be double-weighted, and hence (when the 
two conflict) consumers would be under-represented.  This is an interesting 
light on the longstanding question whether antitrust should seek to protect 
consumer interests or total efficiency. 
 
Analysis with an Ad Hoc Bargaining Model 
                                                           
7 I phrase this as “staff”, but there are in fact many layers of principal-agent relationship, so what I call 
“staff” might in fact be the entire agency and court system, with the true goal represented only at a political 
or even a Platonic level.  
Bargaining is, in part, compromise, so one might hope to model its 
outcome as maximizing a weighted sum of the bargainers’ objective 
functions.  Suppose the government “bargains for” an objective V, while the 
parties bargain to maximize their joint profits, P.  Then this model predicts 
an outcome that maximizes the weighted sum V + bP, where b > 0 measures 
the parties’ bargaining power relative to the agency’s.  For instance, if b = 0 
then the agency can do whatever it wants; if b is large the parties can do 
what they want and the agency is powerless; if  b = 1 then they have equal 
bargaining power. 
 
Observant readers will note that this is not really a well specified model, 
since for example doubling V (which will not affect the agency’s tradeoffs 
and thus should not affect anything) changes the prediction.  In a 
swashbuckling spirit of initial exploration, I will ignore this problem and 
push ahead, leaving it to future work to see whether anything of value 
emerges.  The Nash bargaining solution is a more rigorous approach; I give 
some Nash-bargaining analysis below. 
 
Pushing forward with this ad hoc model, however, suppose for instance 
that the agency’s true goal W is total surplus.  If it simply pursues this goal 
in bargaining, then the outcome will over-weight the parties’ profits relative 
to other components of total surplus, by a factor of (1 + b).  If b = 1, the 
parties’ profits are double-counted. 
 
Suppose then that the agency can negotiate as if its goal V were 
something different from its true goal W.  It might do this, for instance, by 
“instructing staff” to maximize some other pseudo-goal V, even though 
front-office goals are W.
8  How should staff be instructed?  
 
The answer in this model is simple: set V = W – bP.   Then the bargaining 
outcome, which maximizes V + bP, thereby maximizes W.   Two special 
cases seem instructively stark, and a thorny question arises. 
 
First, if b = 1 and W is total surplus, then V should exclude the parties’ 
profits, and thus exclude any merger efficiencies that will not be passed 
through.  As between the consumer welfare standard and a simple 
                                                           
8 See Michael L. Katz, “Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitment,” Rand Journal 
of Economics 22:3 (Autumn 1991), 307-328, for discussion of issues raised by this assumption. formulation of the total surplus standard, this might suggest that even if total 
surplus is the true goal, staff should be instructed to focus on consumer 
surplus.  In the previous section I sketched some reasons why preserving 
consumer surplus might seem a sensible goal; here the argument is for 
negotiating to maximize consumer surplus.  In both cases the point is that 
even total surplus may be pragmatically better served in that way.  One 
might express this as an argument that staff should be consumer advocates 
rather than arbiters of total surplus. 
 
Second, if b > 1 (the parties have a lot of bargaining power), an argument 
for hostility to efficiencies emerges!  Even if W is total surplus, V will now 
put negative weight on the parties’ profits.  The logic is that the parties will 
be fighting very effectively for their efficiencies; the agency should push 
back.  Obviously this idea could have some strange and dangerous 
properties; if nothing else, I would recommend exploring it carefully in a 
better specified bargaining model.  An interesting light on this is that those 
concerned with total surplus often suggest that if enforcement agencies 
become hostile to efficiencies their goals should be changed and their power 
should be reined in.  This analysis suggests that increasing an agency’s 
power (reducing b) may encourage it to take a more pro-efficiency line. 
 
Third, the discussion so far concerns weighing the parties’ profits against 
consumer surplus.  How should the interests of rivals, and in general of non-
party firms, be treated?  The logic above suggests that if the true goal is total 
surplus then non-parties’ interests might be treated much like consumers’.  
Again this raises well-known dangers that should be explored. 
 
A final point arises if we focus specifically on a conventional horizontal 
merger’s price effects.  Consumers pay the full price effect X but the 
merging parties capture only a fraction of that effect: to first order (one 
would expect), the joint share s of the pre-merger parties and the buyer.  
With a fixed-cost efficiency of F, the parties’ private objective function P 
might be roughly F + sX.  Meanwhile the effect on total surplus is roughly F 
– rX, where r measures the first-order deadweight loss effect of a price 
change (typically nonzero if we do not start with a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium).  To make the outcome V+bP  equal to F – rX, V must be (1 – 
b)F – (r + bs)X.  So—again assuming that the true goal is total surplus—the 
model suggests that not only should large b cause the agency to give little or negative weight to proprietary efficiencies, but in addition b and s interact to 
increase the weight on price effects (relative to efficiencies) beyond r. 
 
There is (at least) an extra degree of freedom available: if the bargaining 
maximizes a constant times W, it will maximize W.  To make the outcome 
thus align with F – rX, the model suggests that V should be (c – b)F – (cr + 
bs)X for some constant c > 0.  This reminds us that the bargaining model is 
poorly specified and at best exploratory.  
 
Analysis with Nash Bargaining 
 
Above, I used the poorly specified “maximize V + bP” approach to bring 
out the compromise aspects of bargaining.  Here I briefly pursue the better 
specified Nash bargaining model, reproduce some implications from above, 
and find an oddity. 
 
In Nash bargaining, rather than maximizing the weighted sum V + bP, 
bargaining maximizes the weighted product (V – V0)(P – P0)
b, where the 0 
subscripts denote the values that arise if no agreement is reached.
9    Unlike 
the weighted-sum formulation, this is properly invariant to affine 
transformations of either bargainer’s objective function. 
 
As above, I contemplate choosing V strategically so that the bargaining 
outcome will maximize a true goal W.  Then V = W/(P – P0)
b.  If W were, for 
instance, equal to consumer welfare CS, this formulation could then 
“explain” actual hostility toward profits and efficiencies—perhaps even 
efficiencies that will be passed through, if they increase profits more than 
they increase W.  This latter possibility did not arise in the poorly specified 
model above unless b > 1. 
 
More interestingly, suppose that W is total surplus, which we can write as 
W = CS + P – P0.  (Including P0 makes no substantive difference but makes 
the following manipulation easier.
10)  Then V can be written as  
                                                           
9 A simple transformation shows that this incorporates the generalized Nash bargaining solution in which 
each party’s gains relative to the default are raised to a separate positive power.  In general one must 
distinguish the disagreement outcomes such as litigation that arise if negotiation fails, from those that flow 
to the parties during protracted bargaining; I leave this to future work. 
10 At least, it should make no difference.  As I send this chapter to press, I wonder whether although affine 
transformations of the payoff functions leave the Nash bargaining outcome unaffected, they might 
somehow affect the strategic choice of bargaining pseudo-payoff analyzed here.  If so, all this section V = CS/(P – P0)
b + (P – P0)
1-b. 
In this formulation V will reflect hostility to incremental profits at least 
when b > 1 and sometimes even for 0 < b < 1.  As above, even efficiencies 
that are passed through (and thus raise CS) could lower V by increasing P.  
Another provocative implication of these formulae is that the degree of 
hostility to a given increase in profits (measured as the compensating 
increase in CS that will leave V unchanged) increases as the baseline profit 
level P0  rises.  
 
One oddity is that when b = 1, the V derived from a consumer-surplus 
standard W = CS is identical (up to a behaviorally irrelevant additive 
constant of 1) to that derived from a total-surplus standard W = CS + P – P0.  
I conjecture that the implications for V of different profit weights in W may 




There are well-known commitment problems in giving such strategic 
incentives to agents (see the Katz paper cited above).  Moreover, the parties 
can potentially counter by giving strategic incentives to their own agents, 
although the government might be better able to establish a reputation 
through repeat play with different opponents.  It seems that in this model 
there is a strong second-mover advantage: for instance, given the agency’s 
behavioral goal V, the parties could find a behavioral goal Q to make the 




I have used this forum to urge economic research on negotiation aspects 
of remedy, and to suggest directions for such research.  I do think buyers’ 
incentives are less well aligned with competition than is often thought, 
although I find questions even there.  The other sections of the chapter are 
emphatically incomplete, suggestive, and even provocative. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
would have to be radically re-thought.  [[This struck me as rather strange.  Shouldn’t the reader expect 
you to have worked this out?  Or is this something you are planning to do before publication?]] 